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How Government Reduces 
Employment 
Murray Weidenbaum 
At a time of widespread concern that gov-
ernment is not doing enough to promote em-
ployment, we can no longer overlook the other 
side of the coin - the many ways in which 
government is doing too much, by reducing the 
ability of the private sector to create jobs. 
Through a variety of legislative mandates on 
and regulation of employers, government laws 
and rules weaken the demand for labor and, 
often, the supply of labor as well. Although 
that is not the intent of such legislation, the 
rising presence of government in the employ-
ment process slows down the growth of em-
ployment in the United States. The sad, hard 
fact is that more people would be at work if 
government were a less conspicuous force in 
the American economy. 
As will be shown in detail, government, es-
pecially the federal government, conducts many 
activities which greatly influence the ability of 
the private sector to create jobs. The term 
private sector is not a misnomer because it 
covers non-profit as well as business enter-
prises. Colleges, hospitals, and museums are 
affected as much as business firms. And the 
direction of impact is the same and thus cumu-
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lative - each of the government programs dis-
cussed below raises the cost of hiring people 
and thus discourages the creation of new jobs. 
The central point of this study should not be 
misinterpreted. The aim is not to oppose ef-
forts to eliminate discrimination, protect un-
skilled workers, or help the disabled. Rather, 
this report is designed to show that, quite un-
wittingly, much of the government's social 
legislation has been written in a way that is 
oblivious to its negative impact on employ-
ment. If that undesirable side-effect accompa-
nied only one or two of these programs, per-
haps it could be soft-pedaled. However, be-
cause the harm to employment is so pervasive 
and cumulative, it cannot be ignored. Surely, 
ways can be developed of meeting these 
important social objectives with less economic 
damage to the intended beneficiaries. How-
ever, the design of specific reforms is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
Civil Rights Act 
Of the numerous laws and regulations that 
discourage or slow down job creation, the most 
conspicuous example is the Civil Rights Act, 
including the affirmative action program. 
Although most of us do not like to think about 
it, this popular law does have some negatives. 
For example, it lengthens the amount of time 
that many jobs stay vacant. Any employer 
subject to affirmative action requirements who 
simply goes out and hires people does so at his 
or her peril. In order to reduce - but not 
eliminate - the likelihood of being sued, pro-
spective employers must go through a lengthy 
and expensive process that includes advertising 
in spedfied types of media. The advertised 
position must stay open long enough to provide 
those interested with an adequate opportunity 
to respond. 
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I once had the occasion to study a fascinat-
ing, unintended phenomenon caused by this 
legislation. It turns out that an admonition in 
the affirmative action guidebook issued by the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission - namely, that covered employers 
should advertise in media specifically directed 
toward minorities - has helped to generate a 
new market. An example was the National 
Black Register, which charged $85 per column 
inch at a time that the Sunday edition of the 
New York Times charged $64 an inch to reach 
its circulation of 1. 4 million. The Register was 
distributed to 42,500 organizations and individ-
uals, a circulation equal to 3 percent of the 
Times.l 
A study of affirmative action induced ad-
vertising by colleges and universities in the 
mid-1970s concluded that the cost was "at least 
$6 million a year, though few professional 
placements ever result from such national 
advertisements. "2 Even though the outlay is 
likely much larger now, this advertising ex-
pense seems relatively insignificant when com-
pared with the total cost imposed by the civil 
rights laws, including law enforcement, com-
pliance, and resources directed from other 
activities. However, to most citizens, $6 mil-
lion still is a great fortune. 
Precise measures of the total costs imposed 
by civil rights laws and regulations are illusive. 
Nevertheless, Forbes earlier this year came up 
with an aggregate estimate of $236 billion a 
year or approximately 4 percent of the gross 
domestic product. 3 Because the Forbes esti-
mate is so dramatically large, it is useful to 
examine its individual elements. For example, 
the direct compliance expenses of private 
business necessary to respond to civil rights 
rules are estimated at a smaller but still sub-
stantial amount- $5-8 billion a year. Educa-
tional institutions spend $11 billion annually 
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for the purpose. These direct costs are clearly 
very substantial. However, the truly huge 
costs imposed by these regulations - the 
remaining $220 billion plus - are indirect, 
such as the opportunities foregone because of 
the diversion of management time, energy, and 
resources. 
Wrongful Termination liability 
If civil rights laws are an extremely con-
spicuous aspect of government's impact on the 
employment process, judicial narrowing of 
employers' right to fire is among the least 
publicized. Yet the repercussion of the resul-
tant rise in wrongful-termination liability is 
very substantial. The Rand Institute for Civil 
Justice has revealed the high costs that have 
resulted from the tendency of state courts 
around the country to change traditional em-
ployment law. 
As recently as a decade ago, courts in all 
but 13 states continued to recognize the long-
standing common-law doctrine that allowed 
private employers to fire "at will" workers not 
protected by collective bargaining agreements 
or specific statutes. In recent years, a virtual 
landslide of cases has brought the law closer to 
the requirement that an employee can be fired 
only for cause. Courts have also been allowing 
plaintiffs to collect punitive damages as well as 
lost wages when they can prove wrongful 
conduct on the part of the employer. Rand 
researcher James N. Dertouzos sums up the 
findings, "In a nutshell, the efforts of the state 
judiciaries to protect workers' job security are 
altering employers' hiring and firing practices. 
And one of the results is less hiring. "4 
A Rand study notes that, due to the sub-
stantial costs associated with wrongful termi-
nation lawsuits, firms have responded by 
treating labor as a more expensive input to 
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production. They estimate that, in the adjust-
ment process, aggregate employment drops by 
2-5 percent. 5 
Family leave Act 
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
is the most recent example of government-
imposed costs on the employment process. It 
is fascinating to recall the debates on the bill as 
it wended its way through the Congress. 
Proponents kept asking, "How could anyone 
object to this obviously desirable measure 
which doesn't cost anything?" Just as soon as 
the bill became law, we were "reminded" that 
employers are required to maintain health 
insurance coverage for employees on leave. 
The costs of mandated benefits 
are ultimately borne by employees 
themselves. 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) esti-
mates this cost alone at $67 4 million a year. 6 
One area of uncertainty is the ability of 
employers to recover the cost of the premiums 
they pay to employees who do not return from 
the leaves of absence mandated by the new law. 
Nor does this estimate cover the money 
involved in hiring and training temporary 
workers, who may be both more expensive and 
less productive than the employees on leave. 
Research supports the thesis that the costs 
of mandated benefits such as employee leave 
are ultimately borne by the employees them-
selves. MIT economist Jonathan Gruber stud-
ied three states that passed laws, effective in 
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1976, requiring basic health insurance to in-
clude comprehensive coverage for maternity 
expenses. 
Gruber estimates that the mandate increased 
the cost of insuring women of child-bearing 
age by 1 to 5 percent of their wages. He ar-
rived at this conclusion by analyzing data from 
the Census Bureau. Gruber found that real 
wages of married women of child-bearing age 
fell by 3.4 percent between 1974-75 and 1977-
78 in the three states that required maternity 
coverage. In striking contrast, real wages for 
the same segment of the population rose 2. 8 
percent in five control states that did not re-
quire such coverage. At the same time that the 
"benefited" group of employees suffered a loss 
of real wages, employment among married 
women of child-bearing age declined. Not 
surprisingly, hours per worker in that popula-
tion category rose. That is a logical response 
by employers since the fixed costs of employ-
ing these women had risen, regardless of the 
length of the work week. 7 
Gruber concluded that the increased cost of 
this employee-leave mandate was shifted to the 
women's wages, or to their husbands' wages if 
they had insurance. He found similar effects 
from the passage of the 1978 Federal 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which extended 
comprehensive maternity coverage to insured 
women throughout the United States.8 In sum, 
the enactment of this government mandate 
seems to result in lower employment, lower 
wages, and higher hours worked. 
Mandated Health Care 
The largest prospective government man-
date on employment is health care. At this 
point, nobody knows what specific type of 
health "reform" will be enacted by the 
Congress, or even if such a bill will become 
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law in the near future. A recent roundup of 
views of various labor economists is not 
comforting:9 
Barbara Wolf of the University of 
Wisconsin: "You'd expect to see fewer low-
wage jobs because it would be more expen-
sive to hire less-skilled workers. There's 
reason to be very concerned and very cau-
tious." 
Daniel Hamermesh of the University of 
Texas at Austin: "Either there are going to 
be job cuts or wage cuts or, more likely, a 
combination of both." 
June O'Neill at Baruch College: "Many 
workers will be totally unaffected, but it will 
have a serious effect on low-wage workers." 
Robert Topel of the University of Chicago: 
"Somebody who keeps their job and has 
health insurance may be better off. But you 
have to think about the millions who no 
longer have jobs." 
This near unanimity on the part of labor 
economists concerning the negative effects of 
employment mandates contrasts sharply with 
the view of former consultant Ira Magaziner, 
the top Clinton health-care adviser, who was 
recently quoted as calling worries about job 
losses "crazy. "10 Perhaps the Clinton Admini-
stration should reexamine its position on 
limiting the portion of mental health care to be 
covered by its health plan. After all, should it 
be enacted, the number of people meeting 
Magaziner' s definition of crazy is likely to 
skyrocket. 
Some analysts have tried to estimate the 
employment effects of imposing a health-care 
mandate on American business. Professors 
June O'Neill and David O'Neill of Baruch 
College estimate that the increased cost of 
providing workers with health insurance will 
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lead to the loss of 3.1 million jobs. Not sur-
prisingly, the O'Neills show that low-wage 
industries (such as restaurants) would be hit 
very hard. The cost of the Administration's 
health-insurance package is likely to be the 
same for a highly paid worker as for an em-
ployee with a more modest wage scale. Thus, 
the researchers estimate that a health-care 
mandate will result in an increase of 5 percent 
in labor costs in construction and a 19 percent 
rise in eating and drinking establishments (see 
Table 1).11 
The increased cost of providing 
workers with health insurance will lead 
to the loss of 3.1 million jobs. 
As would be expected, other analysts have 
come up with different figures on the employ-
ment impact of the Clinton health program. 
Economist Alan Krueger estimates that the plan 
would mean 200,000-500,000 fewer jobs in 10 
years than would otherwise be the case; de-
pending on the elasticity of labor demand and 
supply; his preference is toward the lower end 
of the range. 12 In contrast, presidential adviser 
Magaziner believes that "some gain" in 
employment is likely in the short run as well as 
the long run.13 
The short -term effects of imposing a health-
care mandate on employers differ from the 
long-run effects in important respects. In the 
short-run, the great bulk of the costs (80 per-
cent in the basic Clinton plan) is paid by em-
ployers, which should reduce their demand for 
labor. In the longer-run, those costs are 
largely shifted back to workers in the form of 
lower real wages and reduced nonmedical ben-
8 
Table 1 
Impacts of Clinton Health Care Mandate 
Increase In 
Labor Costs 
(Percent) Job Loss 
Eating and drinking 19.1 828,000 
establishments 
Other retailing 7.9 726,000 
Construction 5.1 241,000 
Personal services 11.3 217,000 
Agriculture 15.6 194,000 
Private household 32.9 190,000 
services 
Repair services 8.2 77,000 
All other 2.8 627!000 
Total Economy 3.8 3,100,000 
Source: Employment Policies Institute. 
efits. 14 As a result, the effect on the supply of 
labor is likely also to be negative. In any 
event, the New York Times may have identified 
most succinct! y a fundamental shortcoming of 
mandating health-care benefits - the lack of 
adequate financing: "The tooth fairy, who has 
emerged as a major policy player, doesn't pay 
for health care." 15 
Minimum Wage Legislation 
Without doubt, of all the governmental 
regulations affecting employment, the statutory 
minimum wage has been the focus of the great-
est amount of professional attention. With a 
few, albeit conspicuous, exceptions, the great 
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mass of the research has concluded that in-
creases in the compulsory minimum wage 
cause a rise in unemployment. The segment of 
the workforce most affected is those at or near 
the minimum wage. This is a group consisting 
primarily of teenagers and others with low 
skills who thereby lose the opportunity to gain 
their initial work experience.16 
A 10 percent increase in the 
minimum wage generates a 1-3 percent 
increase in unemployment. 
On the basis of analyzing a great number of 
studies, the Minimum Wage Study Commis-
sion concluded in 1981 that a 10 percent 
increase in the minimum wage generates a 1-3 
percent increase in the unemployment among 
those holding minimum wage jobs, mainly 
teenagers. A smaller adverse effect was noted 
for 20-24 year olds, mostly because a smaller 
percentage of that age group earns the 
mm1mum wage. Confidence in the commis-
sion's estimates is enhanced by the fact that the 
1981 findings were recently replicated using 
panel data from all 50 states over a period of 
15 years. 17 
What about the workers who manage to re-
tain jobs at the new minimum wage? Here, the 
data provide an interesting twist. Many mini-
mum-wage workers are the dependent children 
of the middle class. Much of the gain from a 
higher minimum would go into surfboards and 
stereos, not into rent and baby formula.18 
More seriously, several economists have 
demonstrated that the benefits of the minimum 
wage - to those receiving it - are offset by 
reductions in other benefits. For example, a 
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study of the 1967 rise in the statutory mini-
mum wage showed that workers gained 32 
cents an hour in money income, but lost 41 
cents an hour in training benefits, for a net loss 
of 9 cents an hour in total compensation.19 
It is instructive to estimate the effects of the 
recent proposal by Secretary of Labor Robert 
Reich to raise the compulsory minimum wage 
from $4.25 an hour to $4.50. We can obtain a 
rough idea of the disemployment effect by 
assuming that the past relationship continues to 
hold - a 1-3 percent increase in the unem-
ployment of the affected portion of the labor 
force for each 10 percent rise in the wage. Let 
us apply that ratio to the approximately 5 mil-
lion affected employees, those now earning 
between $4.25 and $4.50 an hour. This proce-
dure yields an increase in unemployment in the 
range of 29,500 to 88,500 workers. To those 
who dismiss the importance of such II small II 
numbers, it is pertinent to ask when was the 
last time they generated 80,000 new jobs- or 
20,000- or even 20? 
Studies of retail establishments in New 
York found that many stores responded to 
increases in the minimum wage by reducing 
commission payments, eliminating bonuses, 
and cutting paid vacations and sick leave. For 
every 1 percent increase in the minimum wage, 
restaurants reduced shift premiums by 3. 6 
percent, severance pay by 6. 9 percent, and sick 
pay by 3.4 percent.20 
It must be noted, however, that a distin-
guished trio of economists has recently come 
up with a contrary conclusion. David Card 
and Alan B. Krueger of Princeton and 
Lawrence Katz of Harvard (currently at the 
U.S. Department of Labor) estimate that the 27 
percent rise in the statutory minimum wage in 
April 1990 had virtually no negative effect on 
employment. The three researchers reached 
this conclusion after studying the question from 
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several viewpoints - using data on individual 
states and on fast-food restaurants in Texas, as 
well as examining the impact of the 1988 rise 
in the California minimum wage. 21 
The disability insurance program 
resembles an early retirement system. 
As would be expected in the case of re-
search that departs from the conventional 
wisdom, many criticisms have been leveled at 
these contrary studies. The studies do not take 
into account the possibility that some firms 
may go out of business because of the cost 
increase to them from raising the compulsory 
minimum wage. 22 Also, the three researchers 
ignore changes in product demand among the 
establishments analyzed. Perhaps employment 
would have increased had the minimum wage 
not been raised. 23 Moreover, the effects of a 
rise in the minimum wage may not show up 
quickly. Employers need time to make per-
sonnel decisions and to substitute machinery 
for workers; the studies cover only a year or 
two. 24 
The bulk of the evidence continues to sup-
port the traditionally negative view of mini-
mum-wage laws. Interestingly, a recent study 
has also examined the effects of minimum-
wage increases on the American restaurant 
industry. Using Bureau of Labor Statistics 
data from 1980 through mid-1991, they esti-
mate the effects of two minimum-wage hikes 
which occurred in 1990 and 1991 (bringing the 
minimum wage to $4.25 an hour). They con-
clude that a 1 percent increase in money-wage 
rates reduced employment in eating and 
drinking places by 0. 83 percent. 
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The first of these two minimum-wage hikes 
was less significant. At that time, the mini-
mum wage had not been increased in almost a 
decade, and most establishments were already 
paying in excess of the federal minimum. 
Nevertheless, allowing for this as well as the 
fact that some portion of wage increases is 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher 
prices, their estimated range of possible job 
losses associated with the rise to a $4.25 mini-
mum wage is 111,000 to 130,000 jobs. 25 A 
study of the federal minimum-wage increases 
in an earlier period ( 1979 and 1980) also found 
negative effects on employment. The em-
ployed individuals who were affected by the 
increases in the minimum wage were 3 to 4 
percent less likely to be employed a year 
later.26 
Other Regulation of Employment 
By no means have we exhausted the list of 
costs that government imposes on the job crea-
tion process in the United States. 
Disability Insurance 
Some public-sector actions operate to reduce 
the demand for labor, while others decrease the 
supply of labor. Let us examine the disability 
portion of the social security program 
(technically, this is the "D" of OASDI, or old-
age, survivors, and disability insurance- the 
formal way of describing social security). The 
disability program is a cogent example of a 
government mandate reducing the labor supply. 
Social security disability insurance benefici-
aries rarely return to work. Once initial eli-
gibility is established, the program resembles 
an early retirement system. In 1987, fewer 
than 8,000 disabled beneficiaries - less than 
one-half of one percent of the total - success-
fully completed a trial work period and thus 
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stopped receiving their monthly social security 
check. 27 In plain English, the more generous 
the benefits, the less willing are the recipients 
to return to work. 
The disability program creates an employ-
ment disincentive, encouraging working people 
with disabilities to drop out of the labor force 
and nonworking beneficiaries to remain out of 
the work force. As benefit levels rise, the 
number of disabled beneficiaries expands and 
the male labor force participation rate declines. 
Between 1955 and 1985, for example, the 
portion of 45 to 55 year old men not in the 
labor force rose from 2.5 percent to 8.2 per-
cent; among 55 to 65 year old males, the ratio 
climbed from 12.1 percent to 32.1 percent.28 
OSHA 
While the disability benefits reduce the 
supply of labor, the rules and activities of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(or OSHA, the small business executive's 
favorite four-letter word) operate to reduce the 
demand for labor. That feat is accomplished 
by increasing the indirect costs of maintaining 
a company work force. Virtually every serious 
study of OSHA concludes that, although the 
costs are substantial, the benefits, if any, are 
modest. Most available studies fail to show 
examples where the benefits of OSHA stan-
dards exceed the costs, although the recent 
OSHA hazard communication standard is a 
prominent exception. 29 
Studies of OSHA performance in the 1970s 
concluded that the agency had no statistically 
significant impact on worker safety. 30 How-
ever, some modest improvement may have 
occurred in the 1980s. OSHA now prevents 
from 1 to 2 injuries involving at least one lost 
day of work per 1,000 workers annually. 31 
At the present time, Congress is considering 
an ambitious extension of OSHA. In July 
1993, the Senate and House Committees on 
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Education and Labor each held hearings on the 
proposed Comprehensive Occupational Safety 
and Health Reform Act. This bill would 
amend the existing OSHA statute to require 
each employer of 11 or more (an estimated 1.6 
million firms) to undertake two new initiatives. 
The first is to create a joint labor-management 
safety and health committee which is granted 
broad authority to influence workplace safety 
and health programs. The second is to estab-
lish and implement a detailed written safety and 
health program. 
The pending OSHA bill would preclude 
any consideration of economic impact in 
setting job safety or health standards. 
In addition, OSHA inspectors would no 
longer have to go to court in order to get the 
authority to order an immediate shut -down if 
they considered a business operation unsafe. 
Each inspector would have discretion to do so. 
Also, the pending bill would preclude any 
consideration of economic impact in setting job 
safety or health standards. 32 
The Employment Policy Foundation has es-
timated that this package of changes in em-
ployment regulation would cost the American 
economy nearly $62 billion a year, a figure 
representing 11. 8 percent of 1990 net business 
income. The major components of this very 
large cost estimate are the required new safety 
and health programs, training, and committees 
(for a total of $38.7 billion). Also significant 
are the costs of recordkeeping and reporting 
($3. 6 billion) and litigation ($8. 6 billion). The 
cost of monetary penalties is estimated at 
"only" $90 million annually. 33 
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Workers' Compensation 
Another expensive burden on the employ-
ment process, and one whose cost is rising 
very rapidly, is workers' compensation. The 
cost of this mandate to U.S. companies is 
escalating. In real terms, the cost of workers' 
compensation more than doubled from 1977 to 
1991. In nominal terms, this required outlay 
rose from $14 billion in 1977 to $55 billion in 
1991. During the same period, lost work time 
due to injuries and illnesses rose far more 
modestly, from about 60 days per 100 workers 
per year to approximately 70 days per 100 
workers. Even taking into account the rise in 
unit medical costs, the workers' compensation 
program is an increasingly generous one -
and extremely costly to employers. 34 
The cost of workers' compensation 
rose to $55 billion in 1991. 
Some legislation affecting jobs is so recent 
that it is premature to attempt to estimate the 
specific impacts on labor costs and on labor 
supply or demand. An example is the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act (ADA), which took 
effect on July 26, 1992 in the case of 
employers with 25 or more workers (effective 
July 26, 1994 in the case of employers with 15 
or more employees). The officials charged 
with carrying out the statute explain that it will 
take extended litigation to determine the full 
scope of the vague and often sweeping provi-
sions of the law, which covers an estimated 43 
million Americans. However, early experience 
indicates that the costs will be substantial. The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is 
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now receiving about 1,000 ADA claims each 
month - on top of its already heavy caseload 
dealing with other discrimination claims. 35 
Conclusion 
Amidst all the scary headlines about mas-
sive layoffs, some important but undramatic 
perspective is necessary. It is true that, in re-
cent months, IBM, P&G, et al. have an-
nounced unprecedented large reductions in 
their work forces. But one of the best kept 
secrets in the U.S. economy continues to be 
that the total number of jobs is growing. Net 
job expansion from late 1991 to late 1993 has 
averaged a little over 1 percent a year. 
However, that is far below the rate of employ-
ment growth during typical recoveries. We 
should be able to improve on that record. 
The upbeat point that needs to be made is 
that the concern with removing governmental 
obstacles to job creation is reasonable and 
manageable. There is no need to throw up our 
hands in despair. There are many reasons for 
the slowdown in job formation in the American 
economy and some of them are amenable to 
sensible policy changes. 
Surely, an important and often overlooked 
factor is the rising load of regulation and man-
dates that government is imposing on business 
and other employers. The direct cost of meet-
ing employment mandates imposed by the 
federal government has risen far faster than 
wages and salaries. Federal mandates were 
equal to almost 3 percent of total wages and 
salaries in 1960. By 1990, the ratio of 
mandated benefits to wages and salaries had 
more than doubled, to over 7 percent. It is one 
thing for the proponents of these mandates and 
regulations to justify them on social grounds. 
Many, if not most of them, would flunk the 
benefit -cost test. If that was not the case, why 
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do the proponents of more employment regula-
tions - such as the Comprehensive OSHA Re-
form Act - urge Congress to keep economic 
analysis out of the regulation-writing process? 
The indirect costs of employment regula-
tions- many of which are both substantial and 
hidden - all share a common characteristic: 
they make adding workers to the payroll more 
expensive. At least initially, they also create a 
substantial gap between the cost to the 
employer and the benefit to the employee. 
These facts are often lost amidst political de-
bates on these issues. Many times, more 
regulation seems a costless way to achieve 
policy goals. 
The costs of employment regulations 
share a common characteristic: 
they make adding workers to the 
payroll more expensive. 
Merely reviewing the estimates presented in 
this paper is staggering (see Table 2). Compli-
ance with the civil rights laws may cost the 
American economy as much as $236 billion a 
year or 4 percent of the gross domestic prod-
uct. Wrongful termination lawsuits may result 
in lowering employment by 2 to 5 percent. 
Mandating health care may involve the loss of 
3.1 million jobs. In addition, employer costs 
are rising rapidly for workers' compensation. 
Moreover, the Clinton Administration appears 
to be developing further impositions on the job 
creation process, such as another increase in 
the statutory minimum wage. 
In the words of University of Chicago law 
professor Richard A. Epstein, "Public dis-
course proceeds as if employment laws are un-
18 
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2. 
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Table 2 
Estimates of Economic Cost for Major 
Employment Regulations and Mandates 
Program Estimated Cost 
Civil rights $236 billion a year (or 
programs 4% ofGDP) 
Wrongful 2-5% lower employment 
termination 
lawsuits 
Parental leave $674 million a year 
insurance costs 
Mandated 3 .1 million fewer jobs 
health care 
Compulsory 1-3 % increase in 
minimum wage unemployment for 
each 1 Oo/o increase 
in minimum wage 
Comprehensive $62 billion a year 
OSHA Reform 
Workers' $55 billion a year 
compensation 
Sources: As cited in text: (1) see endnote no. 3; 
(2) see endnote no. 5; (3) see endnote no. 
6; ( 4) see endnote no. 11 ; ( 5) see endnote 
no. 17; (6) see endnote no. 33; (7) see 
endnote no. 34. 
related to wage levels, job creation, or labor 
output . . . . "36 His colleague, economist Sam 
Peltzman, states the matter more pungently: 
"People who say there is no trade-off between 
19 
regulation and employment are smoking some-
thing. "37 
On occasion, we can find specific evidence 
to support the close - and inverse - relation-
ship between onerous government regulation 
and the willingness to hire. Here are two re-
cent examples: 
WorldClass Process Inc., a new and grow-
ing Pittsburgh processor of flat -rolled steel 
coils, has increased its work force to 49. 
According to the company's chief financial 
officer, "We're going to keep at 49 as long as 
we can," in order to avoid being subject to the 
50 or more employees threshold for coverage 
under the Family Leave Act. 38 
Similarly, the Schonstedt Instrument Com-
pany of Reston, Virginia, a profitable, high-
tech firm, deliberately keeps its work force 
below 50 employees. It does so in order to 
avoid having to file Form EE0-1 every year. 
The company's president makes the point 
effectively, although not in scholarly fashion: 
. . . a friend went over 50 employees on a 
government contract. He gave me his EEO 
file . . . it weighs more than 8 pounds . . . I 
have kept my employment under 50.39 
Perhaps fate will arrange a meeting between 
Mr. Schonstedt and Ira Magaziner. The tooth 
fairy could serve as the referee. 
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